Rawls's practice of ethics adopts as its central focus the ongoing human practice of justification. Rather, it was concerned with a class of facts about ourselves. After briefly surveying the development of analytic philosophy, I argue that Rawls's contribution was to reconceive ethics so that it was an investigation neither of an independent ethical reality nor of the logic of moral language. I advance the view that his work is helpfully understood as fulfilling the promise of the “naturalist” revival in ethics begun at Oxford by Philippa Foot and Elizabeth Anscombe. This article sets out to find out why, then, A Theory of Justice stirred such philosophical excitement, even among British philosophers in a position to recognize its antecedents. Scholarship historicizing John Rawls has put paid to the view that his work was without precedent.
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